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CASE COMMENTS
TORTS: ORAL CHARGE THAT ONE IS A COMMUNIST
AS SLANDER PER SE
Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So.2d 434 (Fla.1953)
Plaintiff, a resident of Jacksonville Beach and landlord of a duplex
apartment in that city, attended a public meeting at the city hall on
April 24, 1950. In the presence of approximately 1500 persons defendant said concerning plaintiff, "'Don't let that man speak, I know
him and he is a Communist.'"
Plaintiff's complaint for slander
did not allege special damages. The trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss. HEL, words orally charging plaintiff with being
a communist were slanderous per se and the complaint stated a cause
of action. Judgment reversed.
Certain types of utterances are recognized as exceptions to the
common law rule that words are not actionable as slander without
proof of actual injury or damage. 2 Utterances actionable in themselves are termed slanderous per se; 3 these embrace words charging
(1) commission of a criminal offense 4 (2) a loathsome disease,5 (3)
unchastity, 6 or (4) conduct, characteristics, or conditions incompatible with the proper exercise of one's lawful business, trade, profession, or office.' The Florida Supreme Court recognizes that words
within these four classifications are actionable per se.8 The Court has
not as yet considered an imputation of a loathsome disease but has
held that words charging unchastity are actionable.9 A statement
that the general manager of a Florida fruit grower's exchange was a
"'crook' "0 and a charge that the Mayor of Jacksonville Beach "'was
'At p. 434.
2Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1875).
3See 3 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 133 (1950).

4E.g., Davis v. Carey, 141 Pa. 314, 21 Atd. 633 (1891).
5E.g., Sally v. Brown, 220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890 (1927).
OE.g., Good v. Johnson, 336 Ill.
App. 227, 83 N.E.2d 367 (1949).
E.g., High v. Supreme Lodge, 214 Minn. 164, 7 N.W.2d 675 (1943).
sSee Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So.2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1953), supported by REsrATEuENT, TORTS §570 (1938).
oPiplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459 (1929); FLA. STAT. §836.04 (1953).
But cf. Hulley v. Hunt, 63 Fla. 179, 57 So. 607 (1912).
10Commander v. Pedersen, 116 Fla. 148, 151, 156 So. 337, 338 (1934).
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at a negro dance hall, dancing with negro wenches' -" have been held
slanderous per se as injuring the plaintiff in his calling. An assertion,
however, that an apartment operator was "'a man of low moral character'" and had been expelled from a Jewish organization, without allegation of special damages to plaintiff's business, has been held not
actionable in Florida.12 Expressions required to give rise to a cause
of action per se for charging a criminal offense in Florida need not
specifically state the crime committed, 13 nor need the offense be a
felony. 4
The traditional libel principle enunciated in the Florida case of
Briggs v. Brown:1 5
"If the publication is false and not privileged, and is such
that its natural and proximate consequence necessarily causes
injury to a person in his personal, social, official or business relations of life, wrong and injury are presumed or implied and
such publication is actionable per se,"
was carried over into the Florida law of slander in Sharp v. Bussey. 6
This partially eliminated in Florida the schism between the two
actions found in most other jurisdictions. The Court in the instant
case cites the two previously mentioned cases to support a finding that
the charge of communism was slanderous per se even though not
17
fitting into one or more of the four traditional per se classifications.
Statements alleged to be slanderous per se will be construed in
Florida as the common man would naturally understand them 8
19
- neither in their mildest nor in their most grevious sense.
The
20
by
indirection,
or
facie
prima
plaintiff
the
injure
declaration may
but when it is not dear that the words charge commission of a crime
"Sharp v. Bussey, 137 Fla. 96, 98, 187 So. 779 (1939).
12Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1953).
'3Tip Top Grocery Co. v. Wellner, 135 Fla. 518, 186 So. 219 (1939); Abraham
v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591 (1906).
14Le Moine v. Spicer, 146 Fla. 758, 1 So.2d 730 (1941).
1555 Fla. 417, 430, 46 So. 325, 330 (1908).
16137 Fla. 96, 187 So. 779 (1939); accord, Tip Top Grocery Co. v. Wellner, supra
note 13. But cf. Mann v. Roosevelt Shop, Inc., 41 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1949).
17At p. 435.

Cooper v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 159 Fla. 296, 31 So.2d 382 (1947).
19Cf. Budd v. J. Y. Gooch Co., 157 Fla. 716, 27 So.2d 72 (1946).
2oCf. Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1953).
'sCf.
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it is a matter for a jury to decide. 21
Florida statutes set out the crime of criminal communism.22 In
one case 23 involving the statutes the Court indicated two things. First,
it held that one can refuse to answer the question, "Are you a member of the Communist Party?" 24 on the ground of possible criminal
incrimination. Second, the Court noted the distinction between the
Communist party that is openly active in politics and the criminal
Communist party that aims at forceful overthrow of government.
Membership or participation in the former is not a crime; membership
or participation in the latter is a crime. The Court in the instant case
made no attempt to fit defendant's accusation into the criminal
offense classification, 25 though the Florida criminal communism
statute provides a basis for such a finding.
A Missouri case held in 1953 that the words ""you are not going
to talk here you damned communist' "28 were slanderous per se as
charging a crime under a federal statute27 similar to the Florida
criminal communism statute. The case is factually parallel to the
instant case with regard to presence at meeting, criminal statute, and
words spoken. A comment on the Missouri decision suggests that
other jurisdictions may conceivably follow Missouri's example and
use the federal criminal statute as a means of holding charges of
communist activity or party membership to be slanderous per se.28
While printed words charging communist activity or party membership have been held libelous per se in the great majority of the
jurisdictions that have considered this question, 29 there is conflict as
to whether oral statements charging such activity are likewise actionable per se. Five cases considering the question in the United States
arose in New York. Remington v. Bentley3" held in 1949 that words
charging a government economist with Communist party affiliation
were actionable per se as injuring the plaintiff in his business, calling,
or profession. Dicta in Weinstock v. Ladiskysl indicated in 1950
v. Zetterlund, 287 Fed. 759 (S.D. Fla. 1923).
22FLA. STAT. §§876.01, 876.02 (1953).
23State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1948).
241d. at 908.
21Summit

2tAt p. 435.
26Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mfo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953).
2718 U.S.C. §2385 (1952).
2829 NOTRE DAMfE LA w. 128 (1953).
2sCases in this area are collected in Note, 171 A.L.R. 710 (1947).
.1088 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), 50 COL. L. REv. 526 (1950).
31197 Misc. 859, 864, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 91 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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that such a charge against a union member would be actionable per
se, but the court failed to state why this would be true. Krumholz v.
Raffer 32 in 1949, Gross v. Mallamud 3 in 1951, and Keefe v. O'Brien3'
in 1952 held that calling plaintiff a communist was not actionable
per se without proof of actual injury. In the Krumholz opinion the
court pointed out that the commission of a criminal offense was not
charged. In the Keefe case the court said, "To hold that calling one
a communist is slander would unwittingly entrap the unwary, for
nothing would please communists better than to enable them to institute suits for damages promiscuously, regardless of the ultimate
outcome."3 5
In 1952 an Ohio case 36 held that to charge plaintiff with being
a communist was not actionable per se without proof of actual damage.
The court stated that it was following the rule set out in an earlier
Ohio case, 37 in which it was held not slanderous per se to charge a
man with sodomy, since this act was not a felony. Communism, said
the court, was likewise not a felony and thus not actionable per se.
Clearly the Ohio court is over-technical in failing to recognize words
producing actual injury.
Several courts38 recognize a rationale that if calling a man an
anarchist was defamatory per se in 1889, 39 calling a man a socialist was
defamatory per se in 1915,40 and calling a man a "Red" was defamatory per se in 1926,41 then calling a man a communist should be defamatory per se today. Current public attitude is probably the final
determinative.
The holding in the instant case that words charging communist
affiliation are slanderous per se appears well reasoned,4 2 despite cases
to the contrary in other jurisdictions. The carry-over of libel reasoning into the Florida law of slander, the Florida and federal criminal
Misc. 788, 9 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1949), 34 MARQ. L. Rav. 31 (1950).
Misc. 5, 108 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
34203 Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952): 15 GA. B.J. 357 (1953); 51
MIcH. L. Ray. 946 (1953); 27 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 374 (1953).
35203 Misc. 113, 114, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
36Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 105 N.E.2d 61 (1952).
37Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326 (1875).
38E.g., Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Burrell v. Moran, 52 Ohio
32195
33200

L. Abs. 465, 82 N.E.2d 334 (1948).

39Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 M11.
345, 28 N.E. 692 (1889).
40 0gren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1915).
41Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926).
42But see 42 GEO. L.J. 169 (1953).
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